







“Rebuild by Design” in New York City: 
Introducing the Context of the Competition 
and Considering a Literature Review on 
Disaster Planning and Resilience Theory
Billy Fleming
Ian McHarg Center, University of Pennsylvania School of Design wflem@design.upenn.edu
Abstract
“Rebuild by Design” è un concorso di progettazione interdisciplinare che ha avuto come obietti-
vo quello di supportare la resilienza della regione di New York a seguito del passaggio dell’ura-
gano Sandy. Il concorso ha visto coinvolti dieci gruppi multidisciplinari, ognuno dei quali ha la-
vorato su un quartiere differente della città entro l’area colpita dall’uragano. Sei di questi grup-
pi sono stati premiati con la spropositata cifra pari ad 1 miliardo di dollari (Community Develop-
ment Block Grant, CDBG-Disaster Recovery funding). Nonostante il concorso abbia ricevuto di-
versi elogi da parte della stampa, resta un tema relativamente inesplorato in ambito accademi-
co. Questo contributo analizza il perché “Rebuild by Design” è emerso come opzione nel periodo 
seguente all’uragano Sandy e le ragioni per cui ha cercato di focalizzarsi sui temi della resilienza 
piuttosto che su quelli più convenzionali dei disastri naturali, attraverso una ricognizione della 
letteratura sulla teoria della pianificazione post-disastri naturali e della resilienza. 
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Abstract
“Rebuild by Design” was a four-stage, interdisciplinary design competition aimed at bolstering 
the resilience of the New York region after Hurricane Sandy. The competition included ten mul-
ti-disciplinary teams, each of which worked within a distinct neighbourhood or city within the 
Sandy-affected region. Six of these teams were awarded a disproportionate share of $1 billion 
in Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)-Disaster Recovery funding. Though the com-
petition received considerable praise from the popular press, it remains a relatively unexplored 
topic amongst planning and design scholars. This paper investigates why “Rebuild by Design” 
emerged as an option in the aftermath of Sandy and why the competition sought to focus on re-
silience-making in lieu of more conventional post-disaster concerns through a review of the liter-
ature on Disaster Planning and Resilience Theory
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In October 2012, Superstorm Sandy – a large, 
slow-moving extratropical storm system – made 
landfall in the New York region. With thirteen feet 
of storm surge, Sandy’s immediate impacts in-
cluded the suspension of subway and commuter 
rail service throughout the region, the disruption of 
commercial activity in the nation’s most economi-
cally productive city, and the near erasure of coastal 
communities throughout the Northeast. Put an-
other way, the nation’s most densely-population 
region appeared wholly unprepared for a relatively 
mild storm. New York’s recent history with tropical 
storm systems – replete with near-misses and false 
alarms – helps to explain why Sandy proved to be so 
destructive (City of New York, 2011).
Though the region’s infrastructural systems proved 
ill-prepared for Sandy, the City of New York – led by 
then-Mayor Michael Bloomberg – showed consid-
erable sophistication in its capacity to recover from 
the storm. First, the city’s PlaNYC network came to-
gether under the auspices of the Special Initiative 
for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR): a planning ef-
fort that resulted in two hundred-fifty recommen-
dations for projects aimed at bolstering the city’s 
resilience at a cost of 19.5 billion dollars (City of New 
York, 2012). But the city’s recent mayoral succession 
cast doubt over the SIRR Report’s future, which, 
even if fully-implemented, would struggle to alter 
the regional landscape of risk. This led the Obama 
Administration to create the Hurricane Sandy Task 
Force – a body tasked both with administering the 
relief efforts necessary after Sandy and with re-
imagining the federal government’s role in disaster 
resilience planning (The White House, 2012). The 
Task Force ultimately recommended the creation of 
a design competition known as Rebuild by Design 
(Rebuild) to generate new ideas for adapting the 
region’s coastline to the effects of climate change. 
The competition received considerable praise from 
the popular press (Fleming, 2015), which inspired 
HUD and the Rockefeller Foundation to launch the 
National Disaster Resilience Competition that is 
currently underway (The White House, 2014).
Rebuild launched in the summer of 2013 as a four-
stage, interdisciplinary design competition to “pro-
mote innovation by developing regionally scalable 
but locally contextual solutions that increase resil-
ience in the region.” (U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, 2013) The first stage, an 
RFP, generated one hundred forty-eight submis-
sions from which ten were chosen to proceed. The 
second stage provided each team with a unique site 
to research and the third stage challenged those 
teams to develop a design proposal for their respec-








with the selection of six winning proposals by a 
national jury of design and planning experts. In the 
final stage of the competition, these six proposals 
received a share of approximately one billion dollars 
in federal recovery funding to further refine and, in 
some cases, construct an initial phase of the proj-
ect. Three of the winning teams focused on sites in 
the City of New York: the Bjarke Ingels Group (BIG) 
in Lower Manhattan, PennDesign and Olin (Penn/
Olin) in the Bronx neighborhood of Hunts’ Point, 
and SCAPE along the Staten Island Shoreline. The 
three remaining teams focused on sites outside of 
the city: Interboro Partners in Long Island (NY), MIT 
in the Meadowlands (NJ), and OMA in Hoboken (NJ).
But as HUD rushes to replicate Rebuild’s model of 




swered: to what extent can a design competition be 
considered a viable form of disaster recovery? That 
question is the motivating force behind this paper 
and one that, at this particular point in time, can 
only be answered through a qualitative, case-study 
research design. Though the Urban Institute (UI) 
published an evaluation of Rebuild in the summer 
of 2014, UI’s report is unlikely to prove useful for ur-
ban policy-makers and planning practitioners (Mar-
tin, Oo, Pendall, Levy, and Baum, 2014). This is due 
to the a-critical nature of UI’s evaluative report and 
the considerable emphasis within it on the leader-
ship prowess of Henk Ovink and Shaun Donovan. 
Though strong leadership is certainly important – 
especially in the post-disaster period – it is an insuf-
ficient response to the question of a design com-
petition’s viability in the recovery process. To better 
respond to the issue of viability, this paper aims to 
present a more complex account of Rebuild and to 
begin building a fuller understanding of the role ur-
ban design can play in promoting disaster resilience. 
More specifically, this paper will assess both the 
concept of a competition-driven disaster recovery 
model and critique the design proposals promulgat-
ed through the post-Sandy Rebuild competition.
Reviewing the Literature on Disaster Planning and 
Resilience Theory
Two bodies of literature are crucial to understanding 
why Rebuild emerged as an option in the aftermath 
of Sandy and why the competition sought to focus 
on resilience-making in lieu of more convention-
al post-disaster concerns. The first is derived from 
the field of disaster planning. This field is concerned 
with the readiness, responsiveness, and revitaliza-
tion of cities before, during, and after a crisis (Rodin, 
2014). The second body of literature is concerned 
with the theory of resilience-making. This field is 
drawn from ideas in ecology, psychology, engineer-
ing, and design about how to make individuals, 
institutions, and broader systems more resilient 
to disruption (Author, 2016). Together, these fields 
outline the theories and actions that helped to cre-
ate Rebuild.
Disaster Planning: The Theory and Practice of Build-
ing Back Better
To understand how Rebuild performed as an instru-
ment of disaster recovery, it is first necessary to 
articulate why a design competition emerged as an 
alternative approach to the status quo. Put anoth-
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er way, it is necessary to understand both how the 
theory of disaster planning influences the recovery 
process and why the practical application of that 
theory rarely succeeds in making cities more resil-
ient to crises.
The conventional approach to disaster planning 
can be envisioned in four simple phases: normalcy, 
disruption, recovery, and resilience. The normal-
cy phase contains the actions typically associated 
with disaster preparedness (list them) as well phys-
ical upgrades to a city’s protective infrastructure 
(Kim and Olshansky, 2014; Olshansky and Johnson, 
2014). During this phase, the conventional position 
of the disaster planning literature is that city plan-
ners only need to accomplish two seemingly simple 
feats. First, they must invest in pre-disaster plan-
ning through high-quality hazard mitigation plans 
(Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, and Horney, 2014; 
Lyles, Berke, and Smith, 2014). Then, city planners 
must fold those hazard mitigation plans into the 
comprehensive plan, providing both the legal justi-
fication for investing in risk reduction infrastructure 
and the means for raising the capital necessary to 
make such an investment (Masterson, Peacock, Van 
Zandt, Grover, Schwarz, and Cooper, 2015).
The disruption phase is the period in which signifi-
cant proportions of the populations are evacuated 
and many essential services are lost. During this 
phase, the conventional position of the disaster 
planning literature is that expediting and coordi-
nating the relief process is the most important 
consideration (Iuchi, 2014; Kim, 2012). FEMA and 
its state-level equivalents across the U.S. are gen-
erally considered strong providers of disaster relief 
efforts. However, scholars have argued this is a 
strength borne out of necessity – by consistently 
failing to invest in protective infrastructure, the na-
tion’s disaster relief industry is well-practiced in the 
evacuation and relief provision processes (Arora and 
Arora, 2013).
The revitalization phase contains all of the activities 
associated with rebuilding after disaster. It is a mix 
of simply reconstructing what was lost as well as 
re-imagining and reconfiguring a city in manner that 
responds to the recent disaster. During this phase, 
the conventional position of the disaster planning 
literature is that the recovery process should include 
a blend of new investments in protective infrastruc-
ture, land swap or buyout programs, and public me-
morialization (Vale and Campanella, 2005; Kim and 
Olshansky, 2014). The primary focus of this phase, 
however, is on delivering these elements of a revi-
talization strategy quickly. This is due to the need 
to provide a safe and tenable environment in which 
residents can return as well as the need to project 
an image of recovery to secure private investments 




in business growth and tourism (Gotham and 
Greenberg, 2014).
The final period – the resilience phase – is character-
ized by the conclusion of a city’s rebuilding efforts 
and the return of normalcy. During this phase, the 
conventional position of the disaster planning liter-
ature is that technological investments are key to 
promoting a city’s resilience. These technologies 
include physical infrastructure like the pumping 
stations and spillways rebuilt in post-Katrina New 
Orleans as well as cell phone push-notifications to 
organize and hasten mass evacuations (Olshansky 
and Johnson, 2010; Rodin, 2014).
If the disaster planning process were realized in this 
linear, idealized fashion, there would be little need 
for an alternative as radical as Rebuild. But for a va-
riety of reasons, the theory espoused within the lit-
erature is rarely expressed in the practice of disaster 
planning (Gotham and Greenberg, 2014). During the 
initial phase of normalcy, low planning capacity and 
insufficient access to capital undermine the ability 
of cities to develop quality hazard mitigation plans 
that can be implemented through municipal bonds, 
special districts, and other infrastructure financing 
instruments (Tierney, 2014). The periods of disrup-
tion and revitalization are similarly complicated 
by issues related to misaligned federal rules and 
regulations that impede the flow of resources to 
disaster-stricken residents, insurance policies that 
create incentives for rebuilding in highly exposed 
areas, and contractor-led rebuilding programs that 
often ignore or exploit the communities most vul-
nerable to disaster (Gotham and Greenberg, 2014; 
Michel-Kerjan, Forges, and Kunreuther, 2012). 
The reproduction and exacerbation of inequality 
through the conventional disaster planning process 
is perhaps the greatest barrier to enhancing a city’s 
resilience in the aftermath of a crisis. All of these 
forces contributed to the decision by HUD to incor-
porate a design competition within the New York re-
gion’s recovery plan. Given that a central aim of that 
competition was to bolster the area’s resilience, it is 
necessary to articulate how the theory of resilience 
applies to the practice of city planning and design.
Resilience and City Planning
Resilience theory can be interpreted through four 
key disciplines: ecology, engineering, social psychol-
ogy, and city planning (Fleming, 2016). 
Ecological resilience can be defined through the 
discipline’s intellectual shift away from the stasis 
of sustainability and towards the dynamism of re-
silience during the late-20th century (Holling, 1973; 
Ahern, 2011). This shift became manifest in the 
practice of natural resource management, as the 
principles of sustainable yield management proved 








incapable of sustaining the world’s fisheries, for-
ests, and other complex ecosystems (Walker and 
Salt, 2012). In their place, ecologists began to the-
orizing – and later practicing – the use of ecosys-
tem-based management practices (EBMP) in place 
of sustainable yield management (Zolli and Healy, 
2012). EBMPs adopt a portfolio-based approach to 
resource management that recognizes the many 
important interconnections within an ecosystem by 
monitoring a variety of factors and adaptively man-
aging in response to new information (Walker and 
Salt, 2006). Ecologists came to view resilience as 
a more pragmatic proposition than sustainability, 
due largely to the issues of scale and regional gov-
ernance that often undermine planning goals relat-
ed to habitat preservation, sprawl, and greenhouse 
gas emissions (Collier et al., 2013). 
Engineering resilience is focused on the application 
of technology and infrastructure in the process of 
managing urban risk. Within the context of coast-
al protection, this body of literature is best under-
stood through engineering’s adoption of green in-
frastructure as a water management instrument 
(Fisher, 2012; Jabareen, 2013). Green infrastructure 
is differentiated from conventional forms of infra-
structure by its networked configuration, its incor-
poration of soft features, and its provision of eco-
system services (Eisenman, 2013). It is recognizable 
in coastal settings in what the USACE now refers 
to as nature-based strategies: a collection of land-
scape features that can be designed or restored for 
the purpose of attenuating wave action and reduc-
ing storm surge heights (Committee on U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, 2014).
Social resilience is derived from a blend of sociolog-




worked on the development of new theories to 
predict and explain the causal link between human 
actions and the disparate disaster impacts borne by 
vulnerable communities (Steinberg, 2000). The dis-
tribution of those impacts – both in terms of proper-
ty damage and lives lost – is often linked to misguid-
ed land use regulation, induced development behind 
flood protective infrastructure, and inefficient flood 
insurance markets (Gotham and Greenberg, 2014). 
Building upon this idea, Naomi Klein developed a 
theory of “disaster capitalism” which describes the 
post-disaster recovery period as “an orchestrated 
raid on the public sphere…combined with the treat-
ment of disasters as exciting marketing opportuni-
ties.” (Klein, 2008) The ideas of Klein and Steinberg 
were eventually expanded upon and merged within 
the broader theory of crisis-driven urbanization. It 
describes the notion that a market-oriented (e.g. pri-
vate sector-led) approach to disaster redevelopment 
would be justified by public officials under the impri-
matur of crisis and that it would lead to and exacer-
bate the landscape of inequality and risk, yielding a 
greater future potential for catastrophe amongst a 
city’s most vulnerable residents. Their theory of cri-
sis-driven urbanization argues that without a fun-
damental reconfiguration of the post-disaster rede-
velopment process, there is little hope for producing 
resilience in our cities (Gotham and Greenberg, 2014).
The role of planning and design during the post-di-
saster recovery period is often expressed in ecolog-
ical terms (Meerow et al., 2016). The pace of recov-
ery – or the ability to “bounce back” – is the principle 
metric against which resilience is often measured 
in the planning literature (Vale and Campanella, 
2005; Reed and Lister, 2014). The instruments that 
are often employed in the service of this metric in-
clude building technology upgrades, enhanced and 
multi-functional flood-control systems, and in-
vestments in community capacity-building organi-
zations (Birch and Wachter, 2006; U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, 2014). Within the context of Rebuild, 
the focus turned primarily to deployment of coast-
al green infrastructure – a form of multi-functional 
flood-control.
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